




Europe and the Multipolar Nuclear Order: Opportunities and Limits

Emmanuelle Maitre

The current period has been dubbed the "Third Nuclear Age," a time that combines a renewed emphasis on great power rivalry, a multipolar nuclear competition and the introduction of additional strategic assets that can destabilize deterrence relationships.ⁱ In this context of multipolarity, Europe may rise as a distinct nuclear player, with specific policies, interests, priorities and forms of leverage. Historically, its views have often been shared within the "Western bloc," coinciding with NATO deterrence and arms control policy. On occasion, European countries have been vocal in defending alternative views, for instance, in the Euromissile crisis, the Second Gulf War (2003) or following the Trump administration's decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The rift between U.S. interests and European priorities will probably intensify under the current conditions, following the publication of the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy.ⁱⁱ

This document indeed establishes clearly that Washington does not share the same security outlook as its partners, and that key threats to Europe, such as Russia, may be secondary for the United States. In addition, the harsh criticism voiced by key members of the U.S. administration against European countries, their leaders, their values, or their democratic and economic systems creates global transatlantic

tensions which resonates at the strategic level as well.

European countries have strong incentives to reframe and reaffirm their positions regarding nuclear strategy more forcefully and more autonomously. This ambition will face challenges. First, "Europe" is not a clear-cut actor: NATO European allies may share perspectives on their security, but do not have an institutional framework to adopt policies. The European Union (EU) has tools and processes, in particular on nonproliferation, but is divided on the role of nuclear deterrence.ⁱⁱⁱ

Second, Europeans may be left with little leverage to meaningfully influence the debate and push for their preferences on arms control, they may not possess the capabilities that could give them weight in negotiations; on nonproliferation, they largely depend on the United States and other major powers for the implementation of restrictive measures. These inherent limitations do not suppress the need for Europeans to revisit their role in defending and reframing the nuclear order by rethinking how nuclear deterrence can serve the security of the continent, how arms control may be used to reduce escalation risks, and how the nonproliferation regime should evolve to address current challenges.

AFFIRMATION AND REAFFIRMATION OF A NUCLEAR EUROPE

Different Layers of Nuclear Deterrence

Europe has historically been in an ambivalent position with regard to global nuclear dynamics. During the Cold War, Western Europe was considered by the Soviet Union as an extension of the Western bloc, and the United States deployed its nuclear weapons in European countries as early as 1954. This aimed to counter the conventional Soviet threat and reassure NATO allies regarding U.S. extended deterrence commitment as American

conventional capacities on the continent decreased.^{iv} Soviet nuclear weapons forward-deployment was also established in Eastern Europe under the Warsaw Pact.^v To this day, NATO nuclear sharing mechanisms have been pursued with strict U.S. control over the weapons based abroad and their employment procedures. Allies taking part in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) are involved in planning the operations. Host nations must consent to the use of their dual-capacity aircraft for the implementation of the mission, and therefore have some influence on nuclear doctrine. However, this mechanism does not establish European countries as autonomous stakeholders regarding nuclear strategy.



An F-35A Lightning II from Hill Air Force Base, Utah, carrying a B61-12 Joint Test Assembly at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, Sept. 21, 2021. | U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Zachary Rufus (public domain)

The exceptions of course are France and the United Kingdom, the two independent

European nuclear powers. Autonomy is a key principle of the French deterrent, and

even if the British one is more integrated with and dependent on the United States, the operation of nuclear forces and their possible employment is fully in the hands of London. The existence of three centers of decision-making was historically framed as strengthening the credibility of the Western bloc's deterrence posture during the Cold War.^{vi} The two independent nuclear-weapon states in Europe have given the continent a special position in the global nuclear dynamics, as these two states have made their own choices in terms of nuclear policy and capacity requirements.

In the context of the Cold War and the years that followed, these nuclear capabilities have been perceived by potential adversaries as largely integrated to the global Western assets. For example, it has been visible in arms control agreements that Russia requires that British and French arsenals be counted in the global ceilings agreed to with the United States.^{vii} Moreover, NATO extended nuclear deterrence remains central for the vast majority of European countries, and therefore a structural factor in shaping reflections on European security.

What New Dimensions?

To this day, the United States has not reconsidered its extended deterrence commitment to NATO countries, and the nuclear sharing arrangements, including U.S. forward-deployed B61-12 gravity bombs and the NPG, are still functional. The cracks in the transatlantic relationship have not led Moscow to change its point of view on the amalgamation of all three nuclear arsenals in the Western bloc or its demand for the participation of Paris and

London in future strategic arms control negotiations.^{viii} However, the tensions between the United States and their European partners, and the growth of the Russian threat are creating new dynamics. French President Emmanuel Macron, consistent with historical positions, has affirmed on many occasions that the French nuclear deterrence had "a European dimension."^{ix} European allies have gradually shown some interest in recognizing that French nuclear forces could play a role for European security.^x In July 2025, France and the United Kingdom agreed on the Northwood Declaration, in which they conveyed their mutual "desire and ability" to act jointly to protect their "common interest, allies, and partners in Europe."^{xiii} In March 2026, President Macron announced new settings for coordination, especially with eight European countries.^{xiii}

"French President Emmanuel Macron... has affirmed on many occasions that the French nuclear deterrence had 'a European dimension.'"

Many questions remain about how Paris and London will implement these promises of coordination, and how specific European countries will take part in the shaping of nuclear policies in the future (for example, through possible assistance to support missions or in contributing capabilities to conventional deterrence).^{xiv} However, it is notable that as part of the rising multipolar order, European countries may share specific interests and policies in this field distinct from their transatlantic ally. Without questioning the role of U.S. extended deterrence, European countries are collectively building the tools to assume

their singularities with regard to nuclear policy, in particular by recognizing that the French nuclear deterrent contributes to European security and that its partners play a role in enhancing its credibility. This more active posture may lead them to refuse being the subject of arms control and defending their interest in taking a more proactive approach.

SUBJECT OR ACTOR IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL?

A Traditional Playing Field

During the Cold War, European security balance was an important focus of nuclear arms control but had not been a direct actor within the various treaties. While Western Europeans were not directly involved in those mechanisms, they did have influence

on what was negotiated. In the NATO framework, the United States consulted its allies to varying degrees and formally obtained their support in the implementation of arms control measures that had an impact on NATO's force structure. When the Soviet Union started to deploy SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), it caused a concern in Europe that a nuclear war could be waged on the continent without involving the United States. To counter this, NATO collectively agreed to the "dual-track" decision, which was the simultaneous deployment of American IRBMs on NATO's territory and the launch of negotiations to remove all IRBMs stationed in Europe. This paved the way to the adoption of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the withdrawal of U.S. Pershing II ballistic missiles from NATO territory.



A French Dassault Rafale and E-2C Hawkeye aircraft prepare to take off from the flight deck of the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle (R 91) in the Mediterranean Sea, March 17, 2022. | U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Claire DuBois (public domain)

Both the United Kingdom and France refused to have their own forces counted as part of a Western bloc arsenal in the negotiation on strategic arms control. While Russia considered both nuclear forces contributing to the overall capacities that NATO could use against it, France and the UK judged that their nuclear deterrent was sized for the strict protection of their nations, and while it played a role in the protection of NATO, it was autonomous and could not be blended with U.S. capabilities. Washington sided with its allies on this point, and French and British forces remained outside the weapons limits set by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), even when Russian rhetoric became quite insistent on that issue.^{xv}

Despite specific concerns, Europeans have globally supported arms control and the effects it has had on their continent: it led to a reduction of tensions by curbing the strategic arms race, the dismantlement of intermediate nuclear forces, a strong reduction of short-range tactical nuclear forces (through voluntary measures), and the implementation of a range of confidence and transparency measures aimed at managing crises.

Reservations and Lack of Leverage

With the increase of geopolitical tensions caused by the war in Ukraine, some Europeans feel their lack of leverage in arms control negotiations between Moscow and Washington may result in harmful outcomes to their security.

On the one hand, Russia has displayed that it can be a threat to Europeans and has developed capabilities (through modernization and treaty violations) that Europe cannot compete with. This is the

case with both short-range nuclear weapons and IRBMs such as the Oreshnik, used twice as a conventional strike system against Ukraine.

On the other hand, the ability to rely on the United States as a security provider is clearly diminishing as the Trump administration continually attacks its European partners. This is pushing Europeans to consider the development of various systems to increase their ability to defend themselves with or without the explicit support of Washington. At the conventional level, this is in part taking the form of investments in missile defense (the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) currently includes 15 countries) and conventional deep-strike missiles (six countries have signed the letter of intention of the European Long-Strike Approach (ELSA) and various cooperative projects are currently ongoing regarding the development of this type of system).^{xvi} In addition, with the impetus of Paris in particular, European countries are more openly considering how the French and British nuclear deterrent may play a role in increasing the security of the continent at large.

In this context, arms control is perceived with caution, especially if it appears to be imposed from major powers who may not have European's best interest at heart. This skepticism is visible in all countries, but for some, historic positions may lead them to preserve a positive rhetoric on the role of arms control, while for others, more concerned by the threats posed to the security of the continent, hostility to restraint mechanisms is more publicly assumed. Regarding strategic arms control, regulating historically nuclear systems

with a range above 5,500 km, the last arms control agreement, the New START Treaty, expired in February 2026. European countries may not be directly involved in potential efforts to negotiate a successor treaty, unless the United States acceded to the Russian demand to count the French and British strategic forces as part of an overall NATO arsenal. Regarding intermediate-range forces, Europe is more specifically concerned, but most countries would be reluctant to support, if it was considered, the resurgence of a treaty based on the INF model. Indeed, countries such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and others have stated that conventional long-range strike options are necessary to offset the imbalance of forces on the continent and increase the credibility of deterrence.^{xvii} As the INF treaty banned all types of missiles, conventional and nuclear, it might not be in the interest of European countries in the short term. Finally, regarding short-range systems, proposals have long been made to suggest reciprocal restrictions on non-strategic weapons deployed by Russia and NATO.^{xviii}

While some countries were rather in favor of using US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe as a bargaining chip to obtain the dismantling of Russian systems until the mid-2010s, positions have since evolved.^{xix} Any reduction or withdrawal of American nonstrategic nuclear weapons from Europe would deal a powerful blow to NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements, given the small number of systems involved, and decrease even more U.S. credibility. Moreover, given the significant imbalance between the number of nonstrategic U.S. weapons deployed in Europe and Russian weapons, it is difficult to envisage an agreement that would be in the interests of

both parties and, in particular, acceptable to the Europeans, without first involving a massive increase in the number of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, which seems unlikely. Finally, compared to strategic weapons, for which verification protocols have been designed and implemented, nonstrategic weapons have so far been regulated solely by US and Russian unilateral, unverified measures. Negotiating unverifiable ceilings or restrictions would probably not be seen as contributing to strengthening European security.

Possible Interests and Tools

Despite this defiance, there remain various interests in Europe for capping capabilities, especially vis-à-vis Russia. At the NATO level, Russia's nonstrategic capabilities have been described as threats. As a reminder, 100 to 120 nonstrategic nuclear weapons are believed to be deployed by the United States in Europe as part of NATO's nuclear mission. On the Russian side, the nonstrategic arsenal is estimated at more than 1,550 warheads.^{xx} Given their range, these weapons are logically intended for the European continent and pose a serious risk of escalation, the extent of which was particularly evident during the war in Ukraine.^{xxi}

In terms of medium-range and intermediate-range systems, Russia had already gained a clear lead even before the INF Treaty was scrapped. The Novator 9M729 (RS-SSC-8) cruise missile has been deployed since 2018 with at least four operational battalions.^{xxii} The Oreshnik ballistic missile, with an estimated range of over 3,000 km, has been used twice in Ukraine and may have been deployed in

Belarus.^{xxiii} Again, Europeans have seen these developments as threats and have recognized their interests in regulating the developments of INF-type of weapons in Europe.

European countries may indeed want to see Russian nonstrategic nuclear capabilities curbed but may be aware that they do not currently have enough leverage to push Moscow to make meaningful concessions. They therefore support the development and acquisition of systems that may be perceived as enough of a concern for Russia to push its leadership to agree to dismantling some of its own systems. Concerning defensive capabilities, the situation is different. Both the French and the UK nuclear arsenals are largely shaped in function of the defensive structures of their competitors. Consequently, the deployment of major defensive systems by potential adversaries has significant implications for French and British deterrence. The Trump administration's ambitions in missile defense, translated through the Golden Dome program, may lead strategic competitors to invest in defensive capabilities as well. France and the United Kingdom have obvious interests in seeing Russian and Chinese missile defensive programs restricted, especially since they do not plan to deploy similar systems and their interest in the Golden Dome program is questionable. Since the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, regulating missile defense has been extremely difficult: during the Cold War, the technical criteria that allowed distinguishing between assets able to intercept strategic missiles and those only deployed to counter tactical threats is increasingly blurred by modern programs. Moreover,

political opposition in the United States makes prospects of controlling antiballistic capabilities unlikely.

Despite these substantial obstacles, missile defense remains an area where Europeans would have a genuine interest in using arms control to reduce adversary capabilities, even if this leads to restrictions on what they themselves are able to develop. Interceptors in space could be prohibited, given the specific risks they entail.^{xxiv} Restrictions on deployment areas and interceptor velocity could continue to be sought but would entail greater concessions in terms of conventional defense.

In 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that "Following the collapse of the INF treaty, France would like to see broader discussions initiated, in which Europe must make its voice heard and ensure that its interests are taken into account in negotiations on a new instrument capable of ensuring strategic stability on our continent [...] And Europeans must be stakeholders and signatories to the next treaty, because this is our soil and a discussion that must not be conducted over our heads."^{xxv} Since that date, the prospects for negotiating a formal arms control agreement have become even dimmer, but for European countries, the parallel rise of the Russian threat and the weakening of the transatlantic bond has led to a conclusion: they must increase their own capabilities to obtain leverage and promote their priorities and objectives with regard to arms control.

PRIORITIES AND LEVERAGE ON NONPROLIFERATION

Preserving a Major Role in the Implementation of Instruments

Europe as an institution (e.g. EU) and as individual states have played a key role for the past twenty years in supporting and strengthening the nonproliferation architecture. This has been the case with regard to the main norms linked to the nonproliferation regime, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In addition to promoting these norms (and its entry into force for the CTBT), European countries have actively supported underlying institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the CTBT Provisional Technical Secretariat (CTBTO). This support is technical, practical and financial. The EU, in particular, has various activities that display this commitment. For instance, it funds regional workshops in preparation of each NPT Review Conferences, supports a project that promotes the universalization and effective implementation of the ICSANT (International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC).^{xxvi}

At the national level, specific countries have been particularly involved in addressing proliferation crises. The E3 (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) as well as the EU have taken part actively in the negotiation on the Iranian nuclear program that led to the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This file remained followed closely by Europeans, who, while promoting the restoration of a diplomatic solution

following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, have also been keen in implementing strictly its provisions, as seen with the implementation of the snapback mechanism in September 2025.^{xxvii} With regard to the North Korean nuclear crisis, it is mostly through the implementation of sanctions that the EU has conveyed its objection to the program.^{xxviii} European countries have also played a major role in the implementation of export control regimes.

This activism is explained by the strong conviction that the nonproliferation regime is a major asset to address the key multilateral risk of proliferation. The health of this regime is essential to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but also to demonstrate the credibility of multilateral measures in framing the international order, a vision which is at the heart of the European project.

A Challenging Positioning Linked to Uncertainties on U.S. Positions

While Europe sees itself as a major stakeholder with regard to nonproliferation, its positions carry some weaknesses that are emphasized by the current geopolitical context. First, at the political level, its action has mostly been complementary to or in addition to US initiatives. Even if there have been occasional differences of approach on some situations, and Europeans have generally been more formal and more attached to global norms than their transatlantic partners, they have mostly shared the objective of restraining access to proliferating technologies, in particular regarding Iran or North Korea.

Occasionally, a division of roles was observed, based on the comparative advantages of the various stakeholders. At the diplomatic level, Washington sought to capitalize on the European investments made during years of negotiations, as well as a potentially more conciliatory image, in order to resume and coordinate negotiations with Iran.^{xxxix} But U.S. power projection has been essential to implement powerful economic sanctions, including secondary sanctions, create coalitions at the United Nations, and lead counter-proliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which aims to stop WMD trafficking, their delivery systems and their components.

In the current context, it is hard for Europe to rely on Washington as a norm-maker and norm-enforcer in the field of nonproliferation. First, the Trump administration has displayed, most recently in Iran, that it believed that force was more efficient than diplomacy and norms to curb proliferation.^{xxx} Second, the Republican administration holds in contempt the multilateral system, and its investment in favor of the nonproliferation regime has largely decreased with the Donald Trump's return to the White House. Not only has the administration excluded the ratification of the CTBT, but it has also implied that it may return to nuclear weapon testing.^{xxxi} Its obsession to deny climate change leads to a systematic denunciation of sustainable development, which creates tension in the implementation of the NPT and at the IAEA. Worse, Trump and some of his advisers have in the past implied that it might consider that if some allies acquired nuclear weapons, it could serve U.S.

interests by decreasing the need for reassurance.^{xxxii}

The unreliability of the United States is of course only one of many challenges for the nonproliferation regime supported by European countries. Russian policy towards North Korea, which ignores UN Security Council resolutions, export control mechanisms and the very principles of nonproliferation, is a major preoccupation as it not only weakens norms but also favors technological development for proliferating countries which may fuel proliferating dynamics in some countries.^{xxxiii}

Deprived of U.S. support, Europeans may find it difficult to uphold their standards with regard to proliferation, especially as the deterioration of the strategic environment is weakening the norms themselves. In East Asia, in the Middle East and in Europe as well, some countries, allies or partners of Europe, have implied that the current situation could justify the launching of national nuclear programs.^{xxxiv} Europeans have the tools to react to this kind of activity, from political condemnation to economic sanctioning. But it is hard to anticipate to what extent they might have the political strength to oppose a partner or ally, or even one of their own, if neither the United States nor the rest of the international community is committed to the nonproliferation regime and is acting sincerely to curb these programs.

The emerging multipolar security environment is creating numerous challenges for the global nuclear order. For European countries, this means that they will increasingly be in a situation where they have to push for and defend nuclear

policies independently. While some of them have always aimed at contributing to nuclear regulations autonomously and following their own interests, they have also leaned heavily on the United States as they shared a strategic vision regarding nuclear matters. This situation may evolve as the transatlantic link gets more fragile and as Washington limits its participation to multilateral institutions linked to nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. It is therefore a key moment for European countries to try to weigh in on the global efforts to regulate global nuclear competitions. Two conditions will be required for Europe to play a role in these discussions and defend its interests: adequate leverage, including through capability development; and strategic cohesion. It is essential for European countries to share their priorities in that field and try to build a common strategy to address rising nuclear risks on the continent.

CONCLUSION

During his speech in March 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that the next fifty years would be a "nuclear weapon age."^{xxxv} He emphasized a vision in which Europe would be more sovereign and able to defend itself against all types of threats. In his eyes, but also for key other European leaders, this need to aggregate various European conventional capabilities, but also to build on the

autonomous nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom. Following this understanding, and without severing the link with the U.S. and its extended deterrence, willing European countries could be able to claim a more independent standing on nuclear affairs and to defend their specific interests in this matter. This is especially true with regard to the nuclear order. In the current context, it becomes impossible to assume that the "Western bloc" may systematically have the same priorities and policies with regards to arms control and nonproliferation. Europe does suffer from disadvantage to play a major role on this front: a lack of military leverage on some aspects, a dependency on Washington, a limited weight in the global system, and internal divisions. But it also has strengths, including a historical commitment to the global nuclear order. By working together on a shared vision in which regulations can bring stability and limit the risks of escalation or arms race, European countries can define a coherent strategy of rearmament which is coupled to a long term arms control negotiation strategy. Likewise, they need to anticipate the upcoming challenges of the nonproliferation norms and use their political leverage and willingness to engage with like-minded countries all over the world to promote adaptations to the various regimes and innovative mechanisms to sustain the principles of nonproliferation, which remains in the interest of all.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Emmanuelle Maitre is Senior Research Fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research. A graduate of the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), she works on issues of nuclear non-proliferation, deterrence and disarmament. Before joining FRS and after working as a consultant in the private sector, Emmanuelle worked as a Research Assistant at the Centre for Arms Control Studies (CESIM).



NOTES

i Jenny Naylor, 'The Third Nuclear Age,' *Comparative Strategy* 38, no 4 (2019) : 276–88. doi:10.1080/01495933.2019.1633185.

ii Department of War, 2026 National Defense Strategy, Restoring Peace Through Strength for a New Golden Age of America, January 2026, <https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF>

iii As Austria and Ireland in particular are actively supporting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

iv Murat Iplikci, 'Why Did the Eisenhower Administration Decide To Deploy Jupiter Missiles in Turkey: a Case Study in Nuclearization of Nato Strategy,' Illinois State University (2019) <https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2182&context=etd#:~:text=Then%2C%20in%201951%2C%20the%20U.S.,forces%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Union.>

v Warsaw Pact Tactical Nuclear Forces in Central Europe, Joint Memorandum, CIA/DIA, March 1975, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00608R000700070001-8.pdf>

vi NATO's nuclear deterrence policy and forces, NATO, June 24, 2025, <https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/natos-nuclear-deterrence-policy-and-forces>

vii Zsofia Wolford, Elizabeth Moisan, Thomas Kenchington, Catherine Galley, Clara Le Gargasson, 'Evolving Russian perceptions of the British and French nuclear deterrents,' RAND Report July 22, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3900-1.html

viii IN BRIEF: Senior Russian diplomat on New START, arms control, ties with North Korea, TASS, November 19, 2025, <https://tass.com/politics/2045681>

ix Dominique Mongin, 'History of the European dimension of France's nuclear deterrence doctrine,' *L'Europe en Formation*, o. 295 (2023), p. 143-157.

x Emmanuelle Maitre, 'L'évolution des réactions européennes à la « dimension européenne des

intérêts vitaux » français,' Recherches & Documents, FRS, August 1, 2025,
<https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/recherches-et-documents/evolution-reactions-europeennes-dimension-europeenne-interets-vitaux-francais-2025>

xi Déclaration de la République française et du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord sur la politique et la coopération nucléaire, Elysée.fr, 10 July 2025,
<https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2025/07/10/declaration-de-la-republique-francaise-et-du-royaume-uni-de-grande-bretagne-et-dirlande-du-nord-sur-la-politique-et-la-cooperation-nucleaire>

xii Lancaster House 2.0 : Déclaration sur la modernisation de la coopération de défense et de sécurité entre la France et le Royaume-Uni, Elysée.fr, 14 July 2025,
<https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2025/07/14/lancaster-house-2-0-declaration-sur-la-modernisation-de-la-cooperation-de-defense-et-de-securite-entre-la-france-et-le-royaume-uni>

xiii President delivers speech on France's nuclear deterrence, France in the United Kingdom, 4 March 2026,
<https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/president-delivers-speech-frances-nuclear-deterrence>

xiv Emmanuelle Maitre and Etienne Marcuz, 'The European dimension of deterrence: prospects for cooperation,' Recherches & Documents, FRS, October 27, 2025,
<https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/recherches-et-documents/european-dimension-deterrence-prospects-cooperation-2025>

xv 'New START Treaty talks should consider nuclear arsenals of UK, France — Kremlin,' TASS, September 28, 2025, <https://tass.com/politics/2022503>.

xvi Alex Burilkov, Katelyn Bushnell, Juan Mejino-López, Thomas Morgan, and Guntram B. Wolf, 'Fit for war by 2030? European rearmament efforts vis-a-vis Russia,' Kiel Report, 3, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 3, June 2025,
<https://www.kielinstitut.de/publications/fit-for-war-by-2030-european-rearmament-efforts-vis-a-vis-russia-18193/>

xvii Timothy Wright, 'Europe's missile renaissance,' Online Analysis, IISS, November 25, 2024,
<https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/11/europes-missile-renaissance/>

xviii Voir par exemple : Pavel Podvig et Javier Serrat, « Lock Them Up: Zero-Deployed Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe », UNIDIR, 2017.

xix Oliver Meier, « Debating the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe: What Germany expects from Russia », Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University, International Relations, 2021, vol. 14, n°1.

xx Hans Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight-Boyle, 'The changing nuclear landscape in Europe,' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 81, 2025.

xxi Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. July 10, 2024, NATO, 10 July 2024.

xxii Michael Gordon, 'On Brink of Arms Treaty Exit, U.S. Finds More Offending Russian Missiles,' Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2019.

xxiii Jonathan Landay, 'Exclusive: Russia likely placing new hypersonic missiles at former

airbase in Belarus, researchers find,' Reuters, December 26, 2025.

xxiv Stéphane Delory and Emmanuelle Maitre, 'The Shield and the Sword: The Impact of Ballistic Missile Defence on Missile Proliferation,' HCoC Research Papers no. 15, FRS, November 2025,

<https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/the-shield-and-the-sword-the-impact-of-ballistic-missile-defence-on-missile-proliferation/>

xxv Speech of the President of the Republic on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy, Elysée.fr, February 7, 2020,

<https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy>

xxvi Implementation Progress Report 2024, EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, EEAS, July 24, 2025,

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025/documents/2024%20EU%20WMD%20strategy%20implementation%20report%20%28draft%2023%20July%202025%20for%20publication%29_1.pdf

xxvii Iran sanctions snapback: Council reimposes restrictive measures, Council of the EU, Press Release, September 29, 2025,

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/09/29/iran-sanctions-snapback-council-reimposes-restrictive-measures/>

xxviii Ramon Pacheco Pardo, 'Europe's Stalled North Korea Policy,' 38 North, December 4, 2025, <https://www.38north.org/2025/12/europes-stalled-north-korea-policy/>

xxix Emmanuelle Maitre, 'Non-prolifération : une priorité partagée de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique ?,' Revue de la Défense Nationale, no. 846 Janvier 2022 - p. 34-45

xxx Manpreet Sethi, 'Counter-Proliferation Sans Diplomacy won't Lead to Non-Proliferation Success in Iran,' Strategic Space, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, July 30, 2025,

https://ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5892

xxxi Daniel Salisbury, 'A return to nuclear testing in an unstable age?,' Online Analysis, IISS, November 5, 2025,

<https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2025/11/a-return-to-nuclear-testing-in-an-unstable-age/>

xxxii Alexander Lanoszka, 'Alliances and Nuclear Proliferation in the Trump Era,' The Washington Quarterly, 41, no. 4 (2018) 85-101.

xxxiii Oskar Pietrewicz and Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski, 'Russia Supports North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programmes,' PISM, October 28, 2025,

<https://pism.pl/publications/russia-supports-north-koreas-nuclear-and-missile-programmes>

xxxiv Nicholas Miller, 'The Future of Nuclear Proliferation after the War in Ukraine,' Proliferation Papers, no. 67, IFRI Studies, April 2024,

https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/migrated_files/documents/atoms/files/ifri_miller_future_nuclear_proliferation_2024_0.pdf

xxxv President delivers speech on France's nuclear deterrence, France in the United Kingdom, op. cit.